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ABSTRACT: Recent disruptive events, such as earthquakes or floods, have caused severe damage to 
civil infrastructural systems. Thus, there is a need to extend the focus of traditional design practices to 
consider resilience-based design approaches which can help in defining preventive actions and measures 
to mitigate the consequences caused by such disruptive events. This paper presents a Civil Infrastructure 
Resilience Assessment Framework (CIRAF) to assess the seismic fragility and resilience of a single or 
interconnected civil infrastructural systems following a disruptive event. Once the information regarding 
the infrastructural system, hazards, fragility databases, components’ damage state correlation, recovery 
models, and upgrade models are identified, then the framework can be used to quantify the loss of 
functionality, recovery time, repair cost, and overall resilience following an extreme event.  Bayesian 
models are used to evaluate the probability of failure of a system, which consists of layers of sub-systems 
and components. A state-of-the-art engineering tool is also developed using the framework that would 
enable the stakeholders to compare different upgrade strategies through an easy to use web interface and 
thus easing the decision-making process. A simplified infrastructural system consisting of 3 components 
is illustrated in this paper using the CIRAF framework. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Disasters arising from natural hazards, conflicts, 
and man-made events have impacted 
communities worldwide. It is almost virtually 
impossible to prevent the damage arising from 
these unpredictable threats. Some examples of the 
tragic incidents that have happened in the recent 
past are the 2011 Fukushima-Daiichi Disaster, 
2005 Hurricane Katrina, and 2017 Bangladesh 
Floods. These events have shown that 
communities are vulnerable to extreme events and 
they not only affects lives but also cause severe 
damage to the civil infrastructure. Current 
building design codes primarily focuses on 
minimizing the loss of lives and do not give much 
importance to disaster resilience – the ability of 
the system to recover from a catastrophic event 
(Almufti et al., 2013). To understand resilience of 
a civil infrastructural system, it is necessary to 
understand how the failure or decrease of 
functionality impacts the performance of the 
system. Therefore, there is a need to extend the 
focus of traditional design practices to include 
resilience-based design techniques which can help 
in defining preventive actions and measures to 
mitigate their effect.  
In recent decades, considerable efforts have 
been made to develop a framework to quantify 
resilience of a civil infrastructural system. These 
studies have leveraged various techniques to 
perform vulnerability analysis, correlation of 
interconnected components, loss estimation, and 
performance analysis. For example, Ruiying et al. 
(2017), Kilanitis et al. (2018) and Tokgoz et al. 
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(2013) have focused on sampling-based 
techniques such as Monte Carlo simulations, to 
evaluate the vulnerability or demand values in the 
event of a particular disaster. Chang et al. (2007) 
have used Matrix-based System Reliability 
methods to compute system reliability whereas 
Gehl et al. (2016) and Bensi et al. (2015) have 
presented a novel way of correlating components’ 
fragility in an infrastructural system using 
Bayesian methods. These Bayesian methods are 
useful in describing the structural and functional 
relationship and can also be used to compare 
systems-of-systems (e.g. network of hospitals 
within a city).  
Quantification of direct and indirect losses 
are critical while assessing resilience. The direct 
and indirect losses, however, are highly 
dependent on the type of infrastructural system. 
For example, Kilanitis et al. (2018) focused on 
traffic flow losses in transportation system while 
in a hospital network, Cimellaro et al. (2010b) 
have expressed losses as a function of the health 
of a population before and after the event. In an 
ideal scenario, a framework should be able to 
accommodate all different types of losses. In 
reality, though, it is not practically possible to 
define every possible losses quantitatively. Thus, 
some parameters have to be neglected to make the 
model more straightforward and computationally 
efficient.  
In this research, an attempt has been made to 
develop a generic framework and open-ended tool 
that can be applied to most of the civil 
infrastructural systems by using Bayesian 
networks, fragility curves, etc. The broader vision 
to provide owners and stakeholders with a 
framework to implement Resilience-Based 
Design beyond Standard Code-Based Design for 
enhancing the capacity of the community to 
withstand and recover from a catastrophic event.   
The following sections in the paper 
summarize the proposed methodology, a case 
study, conclusions and future work. 
2. METHODOLOGY  
The seismic fragility and resilience assessment of 
an infrastructural system in CIRAF consists of 
several steps including 1) definition of the system 
and hazards, 2) modelling of the infrastructural 
components, 3) creation of fragility database, 4) 
determining recovery and upgrade models, 5) 
understanding correlation between different 
components of the infrastructure, 6) estimation of 
losses, and 7) analysis of performance indicators 
as shown in Figure 1.  
 
 
Figure 1 Workflow of Civil infrastructure Resilience 
Assessment Framework (CIRAF) 
2.1. System & Hazard Definition 
This involves modelling of the infrastructure 
system, and investigation of the potential hazards. 
A system can be spatially distributed also known 
as a system of systems or a single system 
comprising of multiple structural and non-
structural components. A transportation network 
consisting of roads and bridges can be modelled 
as a system of systems while a bridge consisting 
of piers, abutments, etc. as components can be 
modelled as a single infrastructural system. Most 
systems consist of thousands of components, and 
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only those components should be defined which 
are of extreme importance to the performance of 
the overall system. Potential hazards (e.g., 
earthquake, or floods) are dependent on various 
factors such as the location of the infrastructure, 
type of construction, etc.  
2.2. Infrastructural Component Modelling 
2.2.1. Fragility Database  
Fragility curves defines the relationship between 
an intensity of hazard and probability of reaching 
a predefined limit states. Many literature, such as  
Cimellaro et al., 2010b and Gehl et al., 2016, 
among many others present seismic fragility 
functions. In this study a database of fragility 
functions are compiled based on available seismic 
fragility functions in Cover et al. (1983) and 
HAZUS-MH 2.1 (2003).  
2.2.2. Recovery Models  
Bruneau et al. (2006) adopted recovery models in 
the form of linear, exponential, and cosine 
functions (Eq. (1) to (3)) to simulate recovery at 
the component level. But these functions could 
not represent the case where restoration does not 
always increase linearly or exponentially with 
time. For example, in the transportation system, 
damages to the roads may result in complete loss 
of traffic flow (Kilanitis et al., 2018) and could 
only be functional once they have fully recovered. 
To account for this case, step recovery function 
(𝑓"#$(&,(,),*)) was included as shown in Eq. (4). 












𝑓"#$)(𝑡) = 	 K
0, 𝑡2& ≤ 	𝑡 < 𝑇4&
	1, 𝑡 ≥ 𝑇4&
 (4) 
where, 𝑇4& is the repair time, and  𝑡2& is the time 
at which extreme event occurs. 
2.2.3. Upgrade Models 
To compare different configurations of the  
system, retrofitting/upgrade models are defined 
characterized by two parameters namely, 
Upgrade Factor (UF), and Upgrade Cost Ratio 
(UCR). UCR is defined as the ratio of the 
additional investment made on the component to 
the original cost of the component. UF reflects the 
decrease of probability of failure after the 
component is upgraded. Thus, UF has an effect of 
shifting fragility curves towards the right 
(Bruneau et al., 2006) as shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2 Shift in fragility curve after upgrade 
2.2.4. Components Fragility Correlation 
In recent years, there has been extensive 
research done to correlate fragilities of multiple 
components within an infrastructural system. 
Some of these techniques are system specific 
(Tokgoz et al., 2013), and their applicability to a 
system of systems is very limited. Methods like 
typical Fault Tree/Event Tree analysis, Matrix-
based System Reliability (MSR) methods (Chang 
et al., 2007), Bayesian Methods (Gehl et al., 
2016) are getting popular as they provide a 
generic framework to relate different components 
in an infrastructural system. For example, large 
infrastructural system consisting of roads, 
hospitals, power plants can be easily modelled 
using Bayesian networks (Gehl et al., 2016). 
This study leverages the Bayesian network as 
the underlying framework to model the 
probabilistic dependence of components and sub-
systems in a system. A system is defined as the 
collection of components or other systems (also 
known as sub-systems), each having multiple 
states. The fragility curve determines the state 
probabilities of each damage state of the 
component whereas states (failure modes) of the 
sub-system or system are defined by the 
experts/analysts performing the analysis, and the 
state probabilities are calculated using the 
Bayesian network. For example, consider a 
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pumping system consisting of a pump, pipe, and 
voltage gear (VG). Possible failure modes that can 
be defined for the pumping system are Failure 
Mode(FM) 1 (System with 100% flow capacity), 
Failure Mode 2 (System with reduced flow 
capacity), and Failure Mode 3 (System with no 
flow capacity). Table 1 gives an example of 
Conditional Probability Table (CPT) that 
associates different damage states of the pump, 
pipe, voltage gear, and the failure modes of the 
pumping system. In this example, every 
component in this example is assumed to have 
two damage states each represented by 0 and 1, 
where 0 mean no damage(intact) and 1 means 
complete damage.  
In the implementation in CIRAF, the system 
consists of component nodes, sub-system nodes, 
and system nodes in the Bayesian networks. To 
allow the capability of combining multiple 
Bayesian networks, there is an additional type of 
node, known as the transferred node. This is 
helpful in splitting the complex network in 
smaller sub-networks in order to ease the 
computational and memory requirement.  
 
Table 1 CPT  for Pumping System 
Pump Pipe VG FM 1 FM 2 FM 3 
0 0 0 1 0 0 
0 0 1 0 0 1 
0 1 0 0 1 0 
0 1 1 0 0 1 
1 0 0 0 0 1 
1 0 1 0 0 1 
1 1 0 0 0 1 
1 1 1 0 0 1 
2.3. Loss Estimation  
Losses incurred after the disaster are uncertain 
and vastly depend on the type of infrastructural 
system. Therefore, only losses arising from the 
physical damage were considered in this study at 
the component level and were calculated using 
Eq. (5) (Cimellaro et al., 2010): 




where, 𝐿P  loss factor for the component 𝑖 ; 𝑃P,S 
probability of failure for the component 𝑖  in 
damage state 𝑗 ; 𝐷P,S  damage ratio of the 
component 𝑖  in damage state 𝑗 ; 𝑚  number of 
damage states of the component 𝑖.  
After the component has experienced some 
damage or losses, it is assumed to start recovering 
immediately defined by one of the equations in 
Eq. (1) to (4). Using the recovered functionality at 
the later time step, new failure probabilities of a 
component are back-calculated using the fragility 
curves of the component. These failure 
probabilities are necessary to calculate losses and 
functionality at the system and sub-system level 
at the later time step using Bayesian network. 
Figure 3 shows the procedure to evaluate losses at 
t > t0.  
 
Figure 3 Flow for calculating losses at the component 
level for t > t0 
 
Evaluation of losses at the component level 
is straightforward but at the system level, the 
evaluation of losses is complicated due to the 
13th International Conference on Applications of Statistics and Probability in Civil Engineering, ICASP13 
Seoul, South Korea, May 26-30, 2019 
 5 
complex arrangement of components within a 
system. Consider an example of a system 
consisting of two components having 𝑚$Z  and 
𝑚$[ damage states. Two failure modes have been 
defined for this system whose conditional 
probabilities for different combination of damage 
states are established using a conditional 
probability table (CPT). For this system, loss 
function for the 𝑘th failure mode can be expressed 









where, 𝐿]^],_ is the loss function of the 𝑘th failure 
mode of the system comprising of components c1 
and c2;	𝐶𝑃_	|	$ZP	,$[S is the conditional probability 
of failure mode 𝑘 when c1 and c2 are in damage 
states 𝑖 and 𝑗 respectively; 𝑃$g,h is the probability 
of component 𝑐𝑥 to be in damage state 𝑎; 𝐷𝑅$g,h 
is the damage ratio of the component 𝑐𝑥 
associated with damage state 𝑎; 𝑤$g is the weight 
factor of the component 𝑐𝑥	calculated by taking 
average of the replacement cost of all the 
components that comprises the system with the 
component 𝑐𝑥 . The probability of two damage 
states of two different components occurring at 
the same time is assumed to be an independent 
event given the fact that the demand values for 
those components are determined independently 
through finite element analysis or by a user. Once 
the probabilities (𝑃_ , where 𝑘 = [1, 2]) for each 
of the two failure modes are evaluated using 
Bayesian inference, then the final loss value for 
the system can be calculated as follows: 




Equations (6) to (7) describe the loss function for 
only a two-component system, but in reality, a 
system would be consisting of more than 2 
components. To generalize the loss function (Lsys) 
at the system level, a matrix formulation has been 
defined. (Singhal, 2018).  
2.4. Performance Indicators   
2.4.1. Resilience  
Resilience (𝑅) was defined at the component and 
system level in terms of the functionality  (𝑄). The 
mathematical formulation was adopted from 
Cimellaro et al., (2010) as shown in Equations (8) 
to (9). It is defined as a function of recovery model 
(𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑐P ), and loss function (𝐿P ) calculated using 
Equations (1) to (6). Thereafter, Resilience (𝑅) 
can be calculated using Eq. (9). After the extreme 
event, functionality is assumed to drop suddenly 
at time (𝑡n)  having a value ranging from 0 to 
100%, where 100 means no reduction in 
performance of the infrastructure after the disaster 
and 0 means complete loss of performance. 
𝑄P(𝑡) = o1 − 𝐿P	p𝐻(𝑡 − 𝑡n)









∙ 𝑑𝑡  
 
(9) 
2.4.2. Repair Time  
Repair time (𝑇𝑟𝑒P) for an individual component 
(𝑖) can be calculated using the Eq. (10). 




where 𝑃P,S probability of failure of component 𝑖 in 
damage state 𝑗; 𝑇𝑟𝑒P,S repair time of component 𝑖 
in damage state 𝑗. Repair time at the system level 
is defined as the maximum recovery time of 
components as shown in Eq. (11). 
𝑇𝑟𝑒]^] = 	max	(𝑇𝑟𝑒Z, 𝑇𝑟𝑒[, 𝑇𝑟𝑒 … . . 𝑇𝑟𝑒) (11) 
2.4.3. Repair Cost 
Repair Cost(𝑅𝐶P ) are calculated by multiplying 
loss function(𝐿P) with the replacement cost(𝐼P) of 
the component. At the sub-system and system 
level, Repair Cost(𝑅𝐶]^]) is calculated as shown 
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2.4.4. Upgrade Benefit Index (UBI)  
Upgrade Benefit Index reflects the benefit of 
upgrading a component on the overall system. 
Mathematically, UBI can be defined by the Eq.  
(13) (Wang et al., 2010). Its value ranges from 0 
to 1, where 0 signifies no prominent effect on the 






where, 𝑄"h#	(P  is the changed functionality 
of system after upgrading Component 𝑖 , 𝑄]^]	 is 
the functionality of the system before upgrading 
the Component 𝑖. 
2.4.5. Damage Consequence Index (DCI) 
Damage Consequence index reflects the 
consequence on the overall system when a 
specific component gets fully damaged or loses its 
complete functionality. This metric has been 
adopted from Wang et al. (2010) and is 
represented by Eq. (14). DCI also ranges from 0 
to 1 where 0 mean no effect of full damage on the 
functionality of the overall system and 1 means 






where, 𝐷𝐶𝐼P is the Damage Consequence Index of 
component 𝑖,  𝑄]^]	 is the functionality of the 
system before assuming complete failure of 
component 	𝑖 , 𝑄]^]	|	(P	h]	hP#  is the 
functionality of system after assuming complete 
failure of component	𝑖. 
3. CASE STUDY 
In this section, a simplified hypothetical pumping 
system was used to illustrate the mathematical 
basis of the framework. 
3.1. Component Details 
The layout of the components (pump, pipe and 
two-story 3-dimensional portal frame) are shown 




Figure 4 Structural layout of pumping system 
 
The north-south (NS) component of the El-
Centro earthquake was considered as the hazard 
for the assessment. The portal frame was assumed 
to be made of eight columns and eight beams and 
does not have any other complex geometrical 
properties. The density, Young's Modulus, and 
Poisson's Ratio are assumed to be 8,050 kg/m3, 
200 GPa and 0.3 respectively. The structural 
characteristics of the pump and the pipe (shown as 
point object) are not explicitly defined as they 
were treated as non-structural component and 
hence, were not considered in the finite element 
analysis.  
The analysis results consisting of nodal values 
of acceleration, velocities, and displacements 
were imported to CIRAF from ABAQUS. The 
demand values for the pump and the pipe were 
arbitrary assumed to be 1.5 g and 1.2 g 
respectively. Drift ratio was evaluated for all the 
steps, and the one with the maximum absolute 
value was used as the demand value for the two-
story frame. The estimated value of drift ratio is 
0.026 rad. Readers can refer to Singhal (2018) for 
more detailed calculations. 
3.2. Fragility Curves 
The demand parameters used for the fragility 
functions are Acceleration and Storey Drift Ratio 
and their fragility definitions have been adopted 
from FEMA (2012).  The portal frame and pipe 
have 5 defined damage states while the pump has 
2 damage states. The first damage state for each 
of the component is Intact where no damage has 
been considered. The other set of damage states 
range from slight to complete damage. 
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3.3. Recovery & Upgrade Models 
Exponential, linear, and cosine recovery functions 
were assumed for pump, pipe, and frame 
respectively. The upgrade factors are also 
summarized in Table 2. 
Table 2 Summary of Recovery and Upgrade Models  





Pump Exponential 10 2.0 
Pipe Linear 10 3.0 
Frame Cosine 20 1.5 
3.4. Component Fragility Correlation 
The damage states of these components were 
correlated to form two other systems. The 
components pump and pipe were combined to 
form a sub-system node called Intermediate 
System (IS). The Intermediate System is again 
combined with the two-story frame structure to 
form a system node called Main System (MS). The 
layout consisting of all three component nodes 
and two system nodes is shown in Figure 5. The 
IS and MS have 2 and 3 failure modes 
respectively and their state dependency has been 
summarized in Table 3. The losses, functionality, 
etc. were calculated using a Bayesian network 
using Eqs. (7) to (11) and the results are 
summarized in the next section. 
 
Figure 5 Layout Consisting of Three Component 
Nodes and Two System Nodes 
 
Table 3 Failure Modes and State Dependency of IS 
and MS Nodes 




(DSpump = 1 and 
DSpipe <= 3) 
Intact State 
(DSIS = 1 and 




(DSpump = 2 and 
DSpipe is any) 
Partial State 
(DSIS = 1 and 1 < 





(DSIS = 2 and 
DSframe is any) 
3.5. Results 
The pumping system was analyzed for two 
different configurations. (1) No components 
Upgraded (As-built), (2) With Upgraded Pump. 
These upgrades are assumed fictitious for the 
demonstration purposes but can be properly 
quantified when used in a real-life infrastructural 
system. Table 4 summarizes the Resilience(R) 
and Functionality(Q) for the 2 analysis cases 
mentioned above.  
 
Table 4 Pumping System results comparison 
Components 
As-Built Case Upgrade Case I 
Q (%) R (%) Q (%) R (%) 
Pump 59.9 98.7 100.0 100.0 
Pipe 76.3 98.9 76.3 98.9 
Portal Frame 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Intermediate 
System 80.8 96 96.9 99.8 
Main System 96.8 99.9 99.7 99.9 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper presents an open-ended framework 
and a state-of-the-art visualization and decision 
supporting a tool to assess seismic fragility and 
resilience of civil infrastructure. It can be used to 
quantify and analyze various performance 
indicators such as resilience, functionality, repair 
time, repair cost, upgrade benefit index, etc. and 
ultimately help decision makers to analyze the 
impact of future disruptive events. It would enable 
them to build better policies to mitigate the risk 
and improve the recovery process. Some of the 
main assumptions that were made: (1) Only 
physical structural damages were considered, (2) 
Recovery of systems and sub-systems are 
evaluated by taking in account the recovery of the 
components/sub-system comprising them and is 
considered to be a function of damage states of the 
fragility curves. As a part of future work, the 
methodology outlined here can be refined in many 
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ways such as, (1) Ability to define and assess 
recovery of the component at the damage state 
level whereas in reality some damage states may 
have more or less recovery time than others, (2) 
Improving the computational efficiency of the 
Bayesian network by leveraging parallel 
processing, (3) Expanding the scope of loss 
estimation by considering flow-based, human 
loss, and other socio-economic losses. 
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